Diaspora

 

CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

DIASPORA AND THE TAMIL TIGER MOVEMENT [PDF]
By Tejal Chandan
June 18, 2007

A critical factor accounting for the sustenance of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the world's most dreaded separatist organisation proscribed in several countries, has been the international support infrastructure it has established over the years. This support base includes not only fund raising but also wide ranging propaganda and publicity, thus becoming a source of both financial and political support for the Tamil cause. It is no surprise that the LTTE enjoys unquestioned support in certain sections of the vast and vocal Tamil Diaspora. These supporters believe that LTTE is the only chance for a Tamil Eelam and the only answer to Sinhalese chauvinism. At the same time, there are others in the Diaspora who desire an independent nation but do not approve of the violent and terrorist methods of LTTE. Then, there are those who nurse nothing but hatred for the LTTE and blame the leadership for the unending suffering of the Tamils in their homeland. This widespread Tamil Diaspora established itself in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Scandinavia (Norway, Finland and Sweden), Switzerland, the United States, Canada and Australia in the midst of a spiralling conflict between 1983 and 2002.

The LTTE leadership had realised the importance of developing an overseas network much before some of the other Tamil militant groups. As early as 1978, Prabhakaran had a dedicated group of supporters in London. However it was only after having lost considerable Indian support in the aftermath of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that Prabhakaran turned to the world Sri Lankan Tamil community and gradually integrated certain sections of the Diaspora into a strong support structure.

The LTTE publicity and propaganda has targeted the Tamil expatriates and host governments mainly in western countries and harnessed support through front organisations such as the United Tamil Organisation (UTO) in the United Kingdom, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) in Canada, The Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations in Australia, the French Federation of Tamil Associations in France, the World Tamil Movement (WTM) and the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations in Switzerland.1 In the late 90s, the FACT and WTM among other organisations were declared as Tiger fronts and brought under anti-terrorism legislations in the US and Canada. Altogether the publicity mechanism integrates sympathetic pressure groups, media units, charities and benevolent non-governmental organisations which galvanise support through publicising Tamils as innocent victims of Sinhalese discrimination and the government's military repression. The single and most important message of these activities is that the LTTE is the only capable Tamil force to fight for an independent nation without which the rights of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka cannot be obtained.


The LTTE also runs a sophisticated fund raising operation which includes voluntary contributions from the Diaspora, funds diverted from non-governmental organisations and other charities, investments in legitimate businesses of Tamil expatriates and human trafficking. Money from the Diaspora is procured through a 'tax' on all families. Funds are also procured through non-governmental organizations where money is collected for the development and rehabilitation of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Tigers usually collect these funds voluntarily relying on the effectiveness of their propaganda. But when this fails, intimidation, coercion and threats are resorted to. Details of the extortion drive were brought out in an in-depth report by the Human Right Watch. Influential people among the Diaspora live in a constant fear for their lives. According to the report, "In Sri Lanka, there is nothing scarier than being a Tamil person of influence-whether you are a teacher, a school principal, a doctor, a journalist, a politician, or a successful businessman. Ordinary Tamils have learned to keep their heads down, do exactly what their neighbors do, and not make waves. These lessons traveled with them to Toronto and London and Paris-where the LTTE and its supporters continued to take over and monopolize social structures, from refugee relief in the 1980s to newspapers, shops and temples. A few threats, a few smear campaigns, a murder or two, and the lesson is reinforced" 2

Actions against LTTE activities have most prominently included the banning of the organisation in several countries. India banned the LTTE in 1991 followed by the US in 1997. The United Kingdom, Canada and the 27 Member-States of the European Union followed suit in declaring the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Inspite of these actions Diaspora support, both political as well as financial, continues to remain strong.

Recent Activities

As armed violence escalated since late 2005, the fund raising drive gained momentum around the globe and LTTE activities once again came under the scanner in several countries. French Police raided several Tiger offices and shops and arrested 19 Tamil Tiger agents; police in Germany began discreet investigations into the activities of suspected LTTE activists in Germany; the Australian Federal Police arrested two Sri Lankan Tamils with terrorism related charges and accused them of being LTTE members. Similar crackdowns have been carried out in Canada and Italy has also reassured the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister that it will continue to keep a close tab on the flow of funds and weapons to LTTE. In the wake of these events, the Sri Lankan Ambassador to Washington alleged that the LTTE sold nearly 1,30,000 Norwegian passports, stolen over a period of time, to the highest bidders and also to Al-Qaeda operatives. The Ambassador also indicated narcotic sales and credit card frauds as some of the other methods used to earn money. The Norwegian Police have however denied the reports on passport thefts.

Taking stock of the international activities of the LTTE over decades, one must be careful to not overstate the effect of recent arrests. Inspite of sophisticated intelligence and monitoring of LTTE activities it is difficult to differentiate the LTTE run businesses from the other legitimate establishments. It is also difficult to draw a line between funds collected for humanitarian purposes and the funds being siphoned off to LTTE coffers. Interestingly, the funds accrued from these activities are at times used to fight costly legal battles for those being prosecuted. The motivation of the Diaspora is something that cannot be measured either. Usually success is followed by more voluntary support while failures may amount to reduced support. The reported increase in the flow of funds to LTTE after the fall of Elephant Pass is just one example supporting this success-failure relationship. The recent air strikes probably have had the same impact. Similarly, the recent eviction of Tamils from Colombo may prove to be another powerful propaganda tool in the hands of the LTTE.

With around 7,00,000 refugees from the current conflict now among the Diaspora and with growing dissent against the policies of the Sri Lankan government mobilisation of support may become easier. Even in Sri Lanka, the Tamil moderates, having given little to hope for from the Government and having no reason to love Prabhakaran, may end up either supporting him or otherwise tolerating his activities. Eventually, for the people in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the crackdown on LTTE activities abroad may mean the discontinuation of funds even for genuine humanitarian purposes while for the Diaspora, demands for support to the LTTE may not come to an end as yet.

End Notes

1. Daniel Byman and Peter Chalk et.al, "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements" RAND Monograph Report, 2001, URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf
2. "Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora", Human Rights Watch, Volume 18. No.1 (C), March 15, 2006, URL: http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/1.htm


 

 

 

 


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