The Stability-Instability Paradox: South Asia
and the Nuclear Future

 

Michael Krepon Flanked by Dr. M.R. Srinivasan and Mr. M.K  Narayanan

Introduction
Dr. Michael Krepon, founder-president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, an independent Washington think-tank on security issues, visited the Centre for Security Analysis on the 16th of October, 2003. He participated in a round-table discussion on "The Nuclear Future" and gave a talk that was open to the public on "The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia." The following brief is based on these talks and the ensuing discussions.

Is it possible to predict the behaviour of nuclear states, and what does the future hold for them? These were the questions that animated Dr. Krepon's talks and he used a theoretical point of departure to orient his response: deterrence theory's "stability-instability" paradox.

What is the "Stability-Instability Paradox"?
Nuclear weapons create both instability and stability in an adversarial relationship between two nuclear-armed states.
Knowledge of the physical consequences of nuclear weapons use serves as a deterrent that prompts states to ensure that that threshold is not crossed. This creates a certain stability in the relationship between two nuclear states.
Paradoxically, this stability destabilizes the relationship. Conviction that conflict with the other state cannot cross the nuclear threshold provides licence for rising tensions and unlimited coercive action short of that threshold.

Michael Krepon delievers the lecture on Stability-Instability Paradox

How does this theory apply to the India-Pakistan nuclear equation?
Like many other theoretical constructions, the "Stability-Instability Paradox" is a product of the study of Cold War politics. Nuclear weapons have created both stability and instability in South Asia, going by the views of those Dr. Krepon describes as "deterrence optimists" and "deterrence pessimists."

Deterrence optimists see a stable equation emerging as a result of both India and Pakistan becoming nuclear weapon states. Their optimism, according to Dr. Krepon, rests on three powerful premises. First, the nuclear threshold has not been breached in past crises between the two countries. Leaders on both sides are aware of the consequences of a nuclear war, and have been very responsible. Secondly, the national economic agenda, particularly in growth-oriented India, militates against a nuclear war on either side. Third, a nuclear crisis will surely be met by third party-namely, United States-intervention.

Deterrence pessimists identify the ways in which the instability part of the paradox is in place in India-Pakistan relations. Dr. Krepon listed conditions that exacerbate this. First, growing conventional imbalance exacerbates nuclear instability. The conventional military balance is tipping in India's favour. India's purchasing power and procurement options are better than those of Pakistan, whose reliance on China is increasing. Secondly, miscalculations result when the two sides don't know each other's capabilities and in the absence of mutual inspections. These miscalculations are likely to trigger a nuclear crisis. Third, this extends to India and Pakistan's ability to read each other's postures. While the two countries are able to interpret conventional moves, they have little understanding of each other's nuclear postures and moves. This can have critical, even catastrophic, consequences. Fourth, as nuclear parity is lost in the long run and the nuclear balance too tips in India's favour, instability in the non-nuclear sphere could spread to the nuclear sphere as well. Fifth, the nuclear threshold is ambiguous and hard to pinpoint, and any of the above factors could trigger nuclear escalation to a point past that threshold. Finally, Dr. Krepon spoke of two vulnerabilities that contribute to instability. While they were attributed to the early stages of the nuclear programmes, both seem to be a function of the differences in strategic depth between two states. The first vulnerability rests in the adversary's knowledge of where the other side's nuclear assets and delivery systems are located. Pakistan is more susceptible than India on this count and less likely, therefore, to give credence to a 'no first use' doctrine on India's part. The second vulnerability is to an attack aimed at destroying a state's top leadership. In its turn, India is more vulnerable to this possibility as its strategic depth places many targets outside Pakistan's reach.
On balance, although elements of both stability and instability are present in the relationship between India and Pakistan, it is instability that is the dominant element.

How might we alter the balance in favour of a stable India-Pakistan nuclear relationship?
Dr. Krepon cited 10 key elements from the Western experience.
1. Do not change or try to change the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by the use of force or intimidation.
2. Avoid nuclear boasting.
3. Avoid dangerous military practices.
4. Put in place special reinforcing measures for nuclear weapons such as their movement, operations, etc.
5. Negotiate and implement nuclear risk reduction measures and confidence building measures (CBMs).
6. Agree on verification arrangements and intensive monitoring. This is because one cannot trust the other's rhetoric and proof will be required.
7. Establish reliable means of communication between political leaders and military leaders of both sides. Talk to each other all the time through regular summits, etc.
8. Establish reliable command and control as well as superior intelligence capabilities.
9. Keep working hard on all these measures and keep improving.
10. Hope for good luck, because even if one works hard on other points, things could go wrong.

What next?
Describing "the nuclear future" as wide open, Dr. Krepon outlined four alternatives.

I. The abolition of all nuclear weapons.
While this was and is the goal reaffirmed by many states and international regimes, it is very hard for nuclear weapon states to give up these symbols of national power and prestige. Further, deterrence calculations dominate security planning, including nuclear decision-making. Dr. Krepon therefore pronounced this nuclear future "very unlikely to happen."

II. Nuclear anarchy.
Fears of an unregulated proliferation of nuclear weapons gave impetus to the creation and promotion of a global non-proliferation regime. These fears have both been borne out and proven exaggerated over ensuing decades. By the forging of regional and global regimes that regulate their production, acquisition and use, and through the unilateral adoption, tacitly or explicitly, of non-use policies, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, no matter what the intensity of a given conflict between nuclear weapon states.
On the other hand, this is a standard of non-use that is easily broken. Further, both radioactive materials and weapons design can be accessed and need to be better guarded. In the hands of terrorists, they could be used to create panic. The questions of preserving these weapons from terrorists as also using them against terrorists, do not figure in the current security thinking. In Dr. Krepon's words, thus, "nuclear anarchy is unlikely but it is worth worrying about."

III. Safe or stabilizing proliferation.
Dr. Krepon dismissed this as an implausible version of the future.

IV. Unsafe proliferation.
Every new nuclear weapon state creates new security dilemmas in the wake of its nuclearization. Dr. Krepon considered such a scenario "a real possibility."

While Dr. Krepon's presentations shied away from assigning blame in the India-Pakistan context, discussion participants on both occasions were focused on explanations for India's policy choices.

Compiled by Dr. Swarna Rajagopalan