PSI as a Concept

Dr.Richard Haynes
US Consul General,Chennai

Vice Admiral S.V. Gopalachari, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, discussed the vulnerability of the open registry or "flag of convenience" system for ship registry to exploitation by terrorists for smuggling in his keynote address to an earlier University of Madras seminar titled, Challenges to South Asian Peace and Security: Emerging Trends. The Admiral's remarks revealed yet another area where American and Indian interests coincide. Gopalachari remarked that over 60,000 ships transit the "New Silk Route" through the Indian Ocean each year. We realize South India straddles the New Silk Route and that Chennai serves as the South's primary port. Finally, we expect increased trade between the US and South India. So, together we should explore options to protect this region's vital commerce from exploitation by proliferators.

PSI Overview

"Even if you have the world's biggest hammer, not every problem is a nail," EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten reminded us when he spoke at the University of Madras on 27 November 2003. He was correct. Indeed, the best way to avoid the use of "hammers" is to act swiftly, when a problem first appears, with appropriate tools. America's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aims to do exactly that.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, require new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to

· Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or a non-state actor of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through:

i. Efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or

ii. Transfers (selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.

· Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

· Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

· Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:

i. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non- state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.

· At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

· To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.

· To take appropriate actions to:

i. Stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and

ii. To enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.

· At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to

i. Require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or

ii. Deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights
through their airspace in advance of such flights.

· If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified

A South Asian Example of PSI in Action

Please allow me to share a "real life" example of PSI in action familiar to those who follow South Asian politics. As you know, A.Q. Khan was regarded as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What many did not know, until recently, was that he had also constructed an elaborate international network that spanned Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, to proliferate nuclear technology to a number of outlaw regimes, including Iran and North Korea.

Over recent years, the United States and several other governments have worked closely to unravel the Khan network. Today, Khan has been stopped. His criminal enterprise is out of business. And at least one key supply line for civilization's most determined enemies has been closed.

Conclusion

In closing, let me underscore that the PSI does not threaten legitimate commerce or exchange. It is not an intrusion, but rather vigilance. It calls for the consent and cooperation of responsible sovereign powers to rob would-be smugglers of cover and concealment in their efforts to proliferate WMD.

Compiled by Tejal Chandan