CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

Inferring from the LTTE Air Strikes [PDF]
By Tejal Chandan
May 15, 2007

The latest of the LTTE air strikes on April 29, 2007 yet again highlighted the seriousness of the escalating conflict in Sri Lanka and the inability of the Sri Lankan armed forces to prevent such attacks. The embryonic air force of LTTE has within a month attacked the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) base in Katunayake, an Army Engineering Unit in Palaly, oil installations on the outskirts of Colombo and also attempted a second attack on Katunayake on April 26. It is therefore significant to assess LTTE's strategy behind the successive air strikes. Though the physical damage from these incidents is minimal, the political and economic costs are enormous. Further, despite reported Sri Lankan military successes in the East, the LTTE has continued to show its prowess to fight back. Apart from this, the killing and kidnapping of Indian fishermen adds another dimension to the spiralling conflict.

Some similarities of these attacks can be pointed out at this time. All the attacks were carried out at night on key government installations by using improvised ordnances. Flight paths were chosen over thinly held areas or over sea and the attacks were carried out with thorough insider knowledge of the working of Sri Lankan air bases. While the previous attacks were military targets, the most recent one was an economic target. Though the SLAF has carried out several air strikes on LTTE air assets, it has not been able to put them out of action. The Sri Lankan defence ministry has been examining measures to counter the air threats. One such measure is to acquire state of art MiG-29 aircraft from Russia and to discuss an overhaul of the SLAF with assistance from Ukraine. There have also been some suggestions to acquire air capability for the Sri Lankan Navy. However, the acquisition of fighter aircraft or other equipment would involve colossal sums of money. Stressing that the country cannot afford the cost of war, analysts have said that the Sri Lankan Government can either raise the defence tax which has already over burdened the people with a sky rocketing cost of living; print more money or get indebted to private lenders; or move into defence agreements with several countries.

The first attack on March 26 prompted Cathay Pacific to suspend its flights to Sri Lanka for a few weeks. In the aftermath of the latest attack, Emirates and Cathay Pacific suspended flights while Singapore Airlines decided to fly to Colombo only during the day. The repercussions for the already suffering tourism industry have become worse with foreign governments issuing alerts with travel advisories. Compounding the situation further was the decision to shut down Bandaranaike International Airport from 10:30 P.M to 4:00 A.M for three months when most of the flights to and from Colombo operate at night. With the stock market falling and the Sri Lankan rupee touching a new low against the dollar, the flow of investments to the country could be significantly affected. A possible hike in war-risk insurance rates could be devastating for exporters as it will raise freight costs and further pursuit of war and its consequences on human rights may lead to fall in international aid.

On the other hand, military advances into the LTTE bases in the North and East indicate that the air strikes are acts of desperation. Right through July 2006 the army has penetrated into the rebels' strongholds in the East. With the security forces establishing control over all highways and coastal zones in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai districts, LTTE has been confined to Thoppigala in the East. With the loss of Batticaloa, LTTE has virtually lost its major source of recruits and resources. Given the fact of a tremendous loss in manpower and a sagging morale of the remaining cadre, the air strikes may be an attempt to draw local and international opinion away from the LTTE's military reserves. While the LTTE's pursuit for arms and finance continues, actions against its support infrastructure in countries like Australia, Canada, France and the US have been successfully restricting Tamil Diaspora activity. This in turn, has made the procurement of arms and ammunitions much more difficult. The Sri Lankan Navy has also been successfully intercepting and destroying LTTE vessels believed to be carrying arms, ammunitions and aircraft parts. The SL Navy successfully repulsed a Tiger attempt in Kayts Island to create mayhem in the peninsula by penetrating into Jaffna islands. In a cordon and search operation carried out on April 29 the troops claimed to have gunned down five LTTE cadres including the Kayts LTTE leader Eeeramavaran. In the wake of these and many other losses, could it be that the air strikes are perhaps the last gambit?

While the air strikes have succeeded in instilling fear in the minds of the Sri Lankan citizens and eroding faith in the capabilities of the security forces, they have also acted as a catalyst for rising international support for the government's clamp down on terrorist activities. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher was quoted stating that the Government has every right to neutralise Tiger air power. On the ground, the army is said to be preparing for an offensive in the North with operations to begin in June or July and one of the first targets appears to be the Madhu areas in the North. The LTTE, in the meantime, is reportedly contemplating the capture of Jaffna. Intelligence reports have indicated possible attacks on targets in the East and vital economic centres in Colombo mainly, the Colombo Port.

The Fishermen Episode

The incident on March 29, 2007 off Kanyakumari coast that left five Indian fishermen dead caused widespread indignation in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties accusing the Sri Lankan Navy of carrying out such attacks. On April 27 the Tamil Nadu Police in a press release stated that the Sea Tigers were directly involved in the firing on the Indian boat based on the interrogation of six Sri Lankan Tamils captured on April 11 who were later identified as Sea Tigers. The Sea Tigers revealed that they had opened fire as they suspected the Indian fishermen of spying after the latter tried to stall their boat demanding fish. The interrogations also revealed that 12 other fishermen who were abducted from the Kollam district in Kerala were in custody of the Tigers at one of their camps.

Since the incident, there have been speculations regarding the intentions of LTTE. Was the incident plainly unintentional or part of a larger design? Does the LTTE want to force the Indian hand in Sri Lanka by deliberately attacking Indian interests? Or could it be a lesson for the fishermen who refuse to cooperate? Further, were the killings carried out with the LTTE leadership's knowledge? If not, is this an initiative of lower level Sea Tigers indicating a crack in the LTTE command and control? These speculations aside, in the aftermath of the incident, the LTTE may be losing whatever little sympathy it might have from elements in Tamil Nadu. In this connection it is significant to note the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's strong statement against the LTTE. "The LTTE has no place in Tamil Nadu" he said making it clear that the DMK Government will allow no room for the banned terrorist outfit and its activities in the State.