CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SRI LANKA: AN OVERVIEW [PDF]
By Tejal Chandan
August 4, 2007

The Sri Lankan Government is now in control of the East after a year long battle that witnessed some of the most serious confrontations between the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSF) and the LTTE since the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). A low intensity conflict that raged since December 2005 blew up into a full scale war after the LTTE blocked water supply from the Mavil Aru Irrigation Channel which affected 15,000 families and 30,000 acres of paddy fields. The Sri Lankan Army (SLA) launched an operation to capture Mavil Aru in July 2006 and since then similar operations continued to push the LTTE out of the East culminating in the capture of Thoppigala on July 11, 2007. This issue of Security Watch summarises the military operations since the beginning of the offensive and gives an analysis of the current scenario in the Island nation.

Even as the SLA's operation in Mavil Aru was in progress, the Tigers launched an offensive in Trincomalee. They struck at Muttur, fired artillery at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters and the Air Force base at China Bay and targeted civilian passenger ferry 'Jetliner' carrying over 800 off- duty security forces personnel as it neared Trincomalee harbour. The Tigers had been able to infiltrate into Muttur and occupy some of the government buildings until the SLA took control of the town. The attack was aimed at cutting off Army supply lines from military bases in Trincomalee and curbing ship movements from Trincomalee to Jaffna which is the lifeline of 40,000 troops and Police in the Peninsula. The sea line of communication between Trincomalee and Kankesanturai is of critical importance considering the absence of an overland supply route-i.e the Kandy-Jaffna A9 route which passes through Tiger controlled areas in the North. The SLSF secured Muttur by August 05 and were in full control of the sluice gates in Mavil Aru by August 10, 2006 even as the LTTE accused the Government of continuing the offensive, rejecting a SLMM brokered deal to lift the water blockade on August 06.

The operations spread to Jaffna on August 11 with the LTTE's attack on the Muhumalai entry-exit point which is the divide between LTTE held Wanni and Government-controlled Jaffna. The defence lines at Kilaly and Nagerkovil along with the Palali Air Force base also came under attack from LTTE's artillery. The Palali airbase serves as a vital air-supply link for the troops as the route through sea often comes under attack by the sea tigers. Sea Tiger boats had also infiltrated into Mandaitivu and Kayts. The SLSF, although tactically withdrawing at first, managed to push back the LTTE and occupy their first line of defences south of Muhumalai. SLSF cleared Mandaitivu by August 12 and repulsed a sea borne attack on the Allaippiddi-Kayts defence lines on August 13, 2006. The closure of the A9 highway, which is the vital transport route linking Jaffna to the rest of the country, by the government led to a humanitarian crisis in Jaffna. The government acknowledged the existence of a crisis situation only much later and took steps to import essential goods directly to Jaffna.

The Trincomalee harbour continued to be vulnerable to LTTE attacks from Sampur town and its adjacent areas. Sampur has been critical for both the Government and the LTTE as it lies directly opposite to the Trincomalee Port and Naval Base. Overtime, Sampur acquired the position of a key LTTE base providing it the opportunity to deploy artillery pieces and bomb the area at will. In the event of continuous hostilities, the regaining of Sampur became an imperative for the SLSF in order to deny the guerrillas a stronghold from which they can disrupt the movement of armed forces. The battle to regain the town was launched by the military on August 28. The ground based military thrust was accompanied by aerial bombardment, artillery fire and naval gun boat shelling. After fierce fighting between the troops and LTTE, the SLSF managed to recapture Sampur on September 04. With the gains in Muhumalai and Sampur, the Security Forces successfully thwarted the LTTE from placing a siege on Jaffna. Fighting continued in Manikerni in the East and Jaffna in the North. Combined with ground operations backed by the Air Force, the Sri Lankan Navy launched operations to deny access to arms and ammunitions to the LTTE through the Palk Straits. On October 11, 2006 129 soldiers of the SLA were killed and another 300 were injured in a single day of fighting. The government claimed it killed 200 LTTE cadres while the LTTE said it lost only 22 fighters.

The operations to capture the next significant LTTE military base-Vaharai (also known as Vakarai) in Batticaloa began on October 29, 2006. The tigers have nurtured their bases in Batticaloa and Amparai through their control of Vaharai and also secured a free run in smuggling arms and narcotics to Sri Lanka from the neighbouring East Asian countries. Besides, the A-15 Batticaloa-Trincomalee road also passes through Vaharai. The capture of Vaharai was planned to put an effective check on LTTE forays into two of the three districts in the East and also end their direct access to the sea in the eastern province.

Part of the Eastern Province in Sri Lanka showing LTTE bases-Muttur, Sampur, Vakarai and Thoppigala that fell to the SLA including the A5, A27 and A15 highways. Source: www.lankamission.com

After three months of fighting that had resulted in swelling numbers of displaced persons, the Army captured Vaharai on January 19, 2007. For the first time in the last decade, the LTTE is said to have fled leaving behind a large haul of arms. Apart from the SLSF, the LTTE had to also face attacks from the Karuna faction. Sri Lankan Special Task Forces launched clearing operations in Amparai and cleared several bases in the district. As a result, the troops gained control of the A15 road. The LTTE is said to have withdrawn most of its troops from the East after the loss of Vaharai.

Inspite of heavy losses in the battle field, the LTTE continued to mount unconventional operations and carry out sporadic attacks on the security forces. The Tigers attempted to assassinate, albeit unsuccessfully, the Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka in April 2006 and Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse in December 2006. Apart from opening fire at troops, they continued to detonate claymore mines and carry out grenade attacks. On March 26, 2007, the LTTE demonstrated its air strike capability by dropping bombs on the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) base in Katunayake in retaliation to a string of SLAF attacks in the North and East. In a month's time the Tiger aircrafts had struck thrice targeting the Palaly military base, oil installations on the outskirts of Colombo and an attempted second attack on Katunayake on April 26, thus, altering the course of the war. Although the physical damage from these air strikes was minimal, the economic costs were enormous, most notably, with the tourism industry bearing the brunt. Major international flights have just resumed their flights after discontinuing them for two to three months.

On the ground, with the control of Vaharai, the SLSF had cut off supply routes of the northern tigers to their cadres in east. Thoppigala remained the last bastion of the LTTE in the Eastern province and its capture was planned in two phases. Thoppigala, apart from being a safe haven, was the Eastern Headquarters of LTTE. The tigers used the difficult terrain around Thoppigala to build several camps and heavily mined the areas surrounding them. The first phase commenced on February 24, 2007 and ended on April 25, 2007. SLSF cleared the LTTE locations bound by the A5 road on the west and the A27 on the southwest. This area is said to have provided depth to LTTE's Thoppigala defences. With the peripheral bases captured, the SLSF commenced the second phase to capture the inner bases of Tharavikulam and Narakamulla. The Tigers on the other hand, having gained new confidence after a series of air strikes, carried out a successful strike on naval detachments in Delft Island. The island territories of Jaffna Peninsula are important outposts providing early warning on sea movements, infiltrations and impending attacks. Thus, they form a formidable barrier to sea borne infiltrations into the Peninsula. The LTTE has tried to infiltrate into these island territories on several earlier occasions. On July 11, 2007, the military declared its control of Thoppigala and the complete ouster of the Tigers from the Eastern Province. The year long offensive "to liberate the east from the clutches of the LTTE" has witnessed hundreds of civilians either killed or injured and thousands more displaced. With regard to the casualty count from both sides there has been a wide divergence in figures from the Government and the LTTE throughout the offensive.

For the island nation, the "Liberation of East" however does not mark the end of the war. Although not in control of territory in the East, the LTTE retains the capability to mount hit and run attacks and launch major strikes in government-held areas. LTTE's political head, Thamil Selvam has threatened that the group will attack Sri Lanka's economic interests. Besides, the military intelligence is said to have raised concerns on LTTE operations moving deep down south due to the loss of Batticaloa. LTTE's defeat in the east may seem irreversible at this time but at several occasions in the past, the group has been able to make a comeback by stealth. The trouble for the LTTE this time around also comes from the presence of cadres from the Karuna faction. According to Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, the downside of rooting out LTTE structures in the North and East is the reduction in whatever influence the political wing may have exerted on the military wing. Peace talks may be unlikely at this time due to LTTE's own reluctance to negotiate from a militarily weak position and the government's militarily favourable position which might make it advantageous to press ahead with the military operation. The Sri Lankan Defence Secretary has estimated a time period of three years to completely defeat the LTTE. The question that lurks around this declaration is- Can the Sri Lankan economy sustain the war for three more years? Moreover, three years is a very long time period in politics. With new political alignments emerging in Sri Lanka the political situation is being watched keenly.

In the East, the government faces a mammoth task of demining the province before speeding up rehabilitation and development programmes and more importantly preventing an infiltration by the Tigers. A string of ambitious development programmes are under way with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) resuming their work. The Government's development programme has tasked the Army and the Police with heading committees on development work in order to keep errant INGOs and NGOs under check and prevent Tiger guerrilla infiltration at the grass roots. With the current state of the people in the East, a sincere reconstruction programme can ensure a fall in the tide of LTTE sympathisers.

The battle ground is now shifted to the North even as the LTTE is still active in the East. Media reports suggest that incursions by the Government into the LTTE stronghold in the Northern Province will prove to be a costly affair in terms of men and material. The SLSF is said to be planning on a three pronged offensive into the North from Mannar, Jaffna and Vavuniya and the Sri Lankan President has said that his government will proceed with the "task of restoring freedom and democracy in all of Sri Lanka". While earlier in May 2007, the chief of the Army had said that "Our plan in the North is to weaken the LTTE militarily so that we are able to maintain our positions there". With possibilities of the situation deteriorating further, the impact on the civilians will be devastating. As for the consequences of continuing the war, in a strong remark, Gareth Evans, Head of the International Crisis Group said that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE have repeatedly violated international humanitarian law and the impact of the war on civilians makes the country a potential case for "right to protection" or right to intervention by the international community. While delivering the Eighth Neelan Thiruchelvam Memorial Lecture in Colombo on July 29, 2007 he also noted that the government's strategy of "fight now to negotiate later" will only work if the government is ready with a package of political and constitutional reforms that appeal to non-separatist Tamils and Non-Tamil parties and advised the government to resist the temptation of taking the war to the North.