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THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN SRI LANKA
By
Tejal Chandan
September
30, 2007
The
All Party Representative Committee (APRC) considered
to be a potentially promising initiative for peace
in Sri Lanka, has found an obstacle in the lack of
consensus over the nature of the Sri Lankan State.
The APRC was convened by the Sri Lankan President
in July 2006. It was mandated with the task to find
a political solution to the ethnic conflict through
proposals for constitutional reforms with an aim to
engage various political parties and arrive at a consensus
through deliberations. After 42 meetings in 14 months,
the decision to adjourn APRC meetings and no further
progress there on has led to the prediction of its
demise and the notion that the APRC has failed to
evolve anything tangible. On the contrary, the APRC
has made considerable progress and arrived at a consensus
on various issues. (See Text Box). The issues that
remain points of disagreement are the nature of the
state i.e. unitary or federal and the re-merger or
de-merger of the North and East provinces.
The
fundamental question of whether Sri Lanka should continue
to be governed from the centre or more power should
be devolved to the provinces has remained a point
of disagreement for decades denying a lasting negotiated
solution. While a unitary government is synonymous
to continued Sinhala domination for the Tamils, for
the Sinhalese, it is seen as a guarantee for the unity
of the country and their majority rule. The Chairperson
of the APRC, Prof. Tissa Vitharana tried to bridge
this chasm by proposing to leave out both the terms
'unitary' and 'federal' from the Sri Lankan Constitution
and instead describing the State as "one, free,
sovereign and independent State" which advances
a Sri Lankan identity recognizing the "multi-lingual,
multi-religious and multi cultural character of the
Sri Lankan society". The Vitharana proposals
adopted a large part of the Majority Report of the
Experts1 Committee which promoted
the need for maximum devolution and power-sharing
at the centre.
As outlined by the APRC Chairman Prof. Tissa Vitharana
the APRC decisions to date are:
-The province to remain the unit of devolution
but the district to be strengthened as an administrative
unit within the provincial framework and on
this basis there should be devolution.
-The Concurrent List, provided for under the
13th Amendment, to be done away with. Central
and provincial lists of devolved subjects to
be clearly defined. Executive and legislative
powers would be devolved on these levels of
administration.
-Within this provincial framework there would
be a 'pyramid of peoples representation' from
the Village Committee and Ward Committee levels
up to the Pradeshiya Sabha and district levels.
These arrangements will be tied up with the
existing administrative systems so that the
GA will be the chief executive at the district
set up charged with channelling central and
provincial funds with corresponding functions
for the Divisional Secretary at the divisional
level.
- Reduce the danger of separation as a result
of power devolution by reiterating the powers
of the President as the Head of State - as set
out in APRC Chairman's document. That is intervention
by the President through the armed forces and
police to defuse any separation threat or even
dissolve any provincial government in the face
of a separation threat.
- Strengthen the 'spirit of cooperative governance',
as set out in the South African constitution,
so that different tiers of government would
work cooperatively strengthening and protecting
national sovereignty
Source:
The Island dated August 15, 2007
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The
current roadblock facing the APRC process reminds
one of the fate of several past attempts at constitutional
reforms, all of which became victims of chauvinistic
politics and the lack of consensus among the Sri Lankan
leadership. One of the first attempts was made with
the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact and later the
Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact. The abrogation of these
pacts sowed the seeds of betrayal and mistrust and
led even the Tamil moderates to demand for a free
nation. The situation was only aggravated with the
1983 pogrom. J. R. Jayawardene's efforts, first in
introducing proportional representation and incorporating
Tamil language rights in the Constitution in 1978
and later in devolving powers to provinces and according
an official status to the Tamil language under the
India- Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987, faced extensive
protest from the south and fuelled a Sinhala insurgency.
In 1995, Chandrika Kumaratunga along with her constitutional
architects, G.L.Peiris and Neelan Thiruchelvam presented
a devolution package based on a federal constitution.
The proposal was an unprecedented move from the SLFP
(Sri Lanka Freedom Party) but this process was also
short lived. The LTTE on its part carried out political
assassinations, virtually eliminating the moderate
Tamil leaders, thus, weakening the democratic voices
within the Tamils. The Interim Self Governing Authority
(ISGA) proposal was the only instance when LTTE presented
a concrete proposal. The ISGA outlined the LTTE position
regarding a framework for political solution which
however did not refer to LTTE's plans to function
within a united country. These proposals were also
set aside on the grounds of being outside Sri Lanka's
Constitution and laws.
In
this dismal background, the positive outcome of the
current APRC process amidst tremendous political activity
has shown the possibility to evolve a consensus on
key issues and propose safeguards against secession.
Besides, the Majority Report is considered as the
most progressive set of proposals since the Peiris-Thiruchelvam
package. However, in seeking a final solution the
political scene in Sri Lanka cannot be ignored. The
APRC received a boost when UNP (United National Party)
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the
SLFP effectively bringing two of the largest political
parties together in the process. However, the MoU
fell apart with a mass cross-over of UNP members into
the Government. The UNP stopped attending APRC meetings
and set a deadline of August 31, 2007 for a final
proposal. Later citing APRC's inability to submit
a final proposal within the deadline, the UNP quit
the process. Dissent within the SLFP also led to the
formation of a break away faction SLFP (M) headed
by Mangala Samaraweera, former Foreign Minister which
has joined hands with the UNP, reportedly, to topple
the Government.
The
Government headed by Rajapaksa is supported by the
pro-war JVP (Janatha Vimukti Perumuna) and JHU (Jathika
Hela Urumaya) and its majority in parliament is based
on ethnic minority parties such as the CWC (Ceylon
worker's Congress) and SLMC (Sri Lanka Muslim Congress).
The pro-war parties have a passionate commitment to
the unitary state and their support therefore will
come at a price of no accommodation with the forces
of Tamil nationalism. The rising cost of living and
coming to light of Government extravagances has frustrated
several hardcore JVP activists and its core base of
trade unions, prompting JVP to carry out protests
against the government. The UNP is also said to be
engaged in wooing the JVP. The recent announcement
by UNP that it will deviate from federalism in resolving
the national conflict is seen as a step to muster
JVP's support in toppling the government. The military
operations on the other hand have increased the sense
of insecurity among the ethnic minority constituencies
thereby reducing chances of steady support from the
minority parties. The government has also to worry
about the return of Chandrika Kumartaunga and is concerned
that she may lure loyalists and disgruntled elements
to break away from SLFP.
With
regard to the military operations, Defense Secretary
Gothabaya Rajapaksa declared that a political solution
will be possible only after a comprehensive military
defeat of the LTTE and victories in the East need
to be complemented with victories in the North. There
has been a slow but sure military thrust by the Sri
Lankan security forces. The Navy intercepted and destroyed
three cargo vessels of the LTTE. The Army gained full
control of the entire area south of Mannar including
Sea Tiger bases in Silvathurai, Arippu and several
other areas. The Army also captured LTTE's FDL near
Yodha Wewa (Giant Tank) north of Mannar. The pressure
may be mounting for the LTTE but the fact that it
has not engaged in any major military attacks in the
recent months indicates to the fact that they have
also not expended vast quantities of ammunition. LTTE's
Political Head S. P. Thamilchelvan in an interview
to TamilNet stated that the outfit's patience was
intentional and it was restricting itself to a defensive
war. Incidentally, in the back ground the President's
impending visit to New York to address the UN General
Assembly Gothabaya Rajapaksa invited the LTTE to the
negotiating table. Nevertheless the Government's commitment
to a political solution has been questioned. Past
experiences of military solutions in Sri Lanka have
indicated that the impetus for political reform ends
once the Government defeats its opponent.
Deterioration
of the human rights situation, executions and rising
abductions has also given rise to international pressure.
On the eve of Mahinda Rajapaksa's address to the UN
General Assembly Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Summary and Arbitary Killings stated that the situation
in Sri Lanka had erupted into a crisis and extra judicial
killings need to be stopped. Earlier in August this
year, Sir John Holmes, UN Under-Secretary General
for Humanitarian Affairs, called the record of the
safety of humanitarian workers in Sri Lanka as one
of the worst in the world. Currently the UN Special
Envoy Manfred Nowak is in Sri Lanka and his visit
will be followed by a fact- finding mission by the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.
Given
the rising costs of living and the war against LTTE
the need for a political solution is felt by all sides
in Sri Lanka. Two recent opinion polls, one by the
Marga Institute in collaboration with the National
Peace Council and another by the Centre for Policy
Alternatives highlight the growing acceptance of a
political solution over the military option. They
also indicate the space available for negotiations
with the LTTE. The Marga survey was a deliberative
poll conducted between May- June 2007 in Ampara in
the Eastern Province and 17 other districts from all
other provinces excluding the North. The survey largely
reflects the positions of the majority and the Muslim
community. According to the survey, an assessment
of the efficacy of a military solution led 72 percent
of the respondents to conclude that a political solution
is the best guarantee for a lasting peace. The study
further notes that this readiness of 72 percent to
"envisage a future where LTTE is part and parcel
of a restructured Sri Lankan polity reveals the space
available for arriving at a political settlement that
has public backing." On the question of devolution
of powers, 44.7 percent support the Indian model while
only 22.1 percent accept a fully federal system. The
CPA opinion poll conducted as part of its study of
Peace Confidence Index in June 2007 saw a majority
95.4 percent of Up-Country Tamils, 93.1 percent of
Muslims and 52.9 percent of Sinhalas supporting a
solution through peace talks. If at this moment in
time, a political solution acceptable to ethnic minorities
is accepted by the Government, the impetus for peace
will lie on the LTTE. Such a proposal can lead to
immense pressure on the LTTE from the Tamils and the
International community.
Foot Note
1.
The Experts Committee was a 17-member multi-ethnic
panel of experts formed to provide advice and submit
recommendations regarding power sharing and constitutional
reform to the APRC. The expert committee produced
four different reports. The Majority Report was submitted
by 11 members representing the three major ethnic
groups. Four other members submitted another report
and two others submitted two separate reports.
Text
of APRC Chairperson's Proposals
Text
of Majority Report of Expert Committee
See also: All Party Representative
Commitee, Security Watch, 19 March 2007
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