Religion, Civil Society and Governance: The Indian Perspective

Dr. Rowena Robinson

Introduction

Clearly, there is a realization today that security issues are extremely complex. They do not merely involve border issues or issues to do with external affairs. Security has a great deal to do with the social and economic profiles within a particular nation as well as those between nations. Security is related to inter-group and state-society relations within a particular nation. In every nation, there may be one or more communities or groups or regions that may feel alienated from the state or marginalized from the circles of power.

In the United States as other First World countries, this realization may be more recent. It may have emerged after 9/11 or London's 7/7 bombings. India, it may be asserted, does have a longer experience in this regard. It has always made attempts to keep communication open with disaffected groups. It has sought to bring these groups to the negotiating table, whether in Punjab, in the north-east or in Kashmir. The early period of independence saw national politics in the hands of the Congress. Generally, the Congress followed the tradition of being an 'Umbrella party', trying to accommodate diverse interests within the fold of national politics. Today we have the emergence of coalition politics. Coalition politics relies crucially on the representation of diverse groups and regions in politics.

Let us look at the concepts we have to deal with more closely. I begin with the concept of civil society. Civil society is an important concept today. It includes social institutions and networks which lie outside of the state and the market. Thus, it includes under its definition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), communities and local groups. Civil society may be defined as the space of interaction between the state and society. What about governance? What is governance? Today we talk mainly in terms of good governance in development and social science discourses. Good governance involves adopting initiatives that develop capacities which in turn realize development and empower the poor and marginalized. Good governance involves the management of power and resources in a way that is participative, equitable, transparent and efficient. Both these are very broad issues.

Focus on social exclusion and democracy

In this presentation, I focus on the idea of 'social exclusion' as an indicator of a group's participation or lack of it in the social, political and civic spheres. The concept is employed specifically to try and understand the social, economic and political place of Muslims in modern India. What is attempted is the understanding of the ways in which discrimination and deprivation work and how proactive policies, the law and democracy (vital ingredients of good governance) may protect rights, increase participation and enhance securities.

It should be clear that despite 'umbrella' or coalition politics, some communities and regions may remain under-represented in politics as well as in other arenas of social life. They may not be able to fully participate in the life of the society. Apart from this, there may even be systematic or pervasive discrimination which may prevent groups or individuals from those groups from active participation in social life.

Social exclusion is here understood as the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life of the mainstream society, implicating thereby alienation and distance. The focus here is particularly on Muslims, though there may certainly be other such groups.

Terrorism and Muslims

After 9/11, the United States realized the extent of disaffection of Muslims and Muslim countries. In India there has long prevailed an idea that Muslims constitute a fifth column. This idea has been unfortunately buttressed by a variety of factors. These include the history of Partition, the long battle over Kashmir with Pakistan and Hindu-Muslim violence in different parts of the country in the period after Independence. Other factors include the long-running Babri Masjid controversy, the Shah Bano case and more recently the Mumbai blasts of 1993 and later years and the Akshardham attack. For many, the conclusion is that the Indian Muslim is prone to violence and becomes a 'natural' suspect in incidents of terror.

While a genuine fear of terrorist activity may not and must not be dismissed, it must be asserted that the vilification of an entire community cannot aid understanding or contribute a solution. Terror activity can happen any time and is difficult to prevent. Our efforts cannot focus solely on terror prevention through increasing security measures in the narrow sense. We have to think about creating more equitable and just social and political structures; we have to think about creating responsive government and empowering communities. In the long run, this will be our bulwark against terror.

It is unfortunate that there have been many occurrences over the past two decades or so that have contributed to spreading fear and uncertainty among many groups, especially minorities. The political shifts of recent times have even seen the public questioning of the idea of secularism and its value for the Indian nation by some political parties. This has contributed to a growing sense of unease among different communities. There has been increasing collective violence against minorities - Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. In many incidents of violence, the complicity of the state has been pointed out by scholarly and investigative reports.

'Pampered' minority or deprived community

Just over 12 per cent of India's population, in fact every eighth Indian citizen, is Muslim. India has more Muslims than Pakistan and Muslims qualify probably to be called India's second majority, rather than merely its largest minority. Even so, the average standard of living of Indian Muslims is below that of the Other Backward Classes and only slightly better than that of the Scheduled Castes. There are 43 per cent Muslims below the poverty line as compared to 39 per cent Hindus and 50 per cent Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (NSSO 438th Report).

The incomes of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims are 32 per cent, 24 per cent and 11 per cent below the national average. There are more rural Muslims who remain landless than either Hindus or Christians. In fact, 60 per cent of Muslims own no land or less than one acre of land. There are more Muslims self-employed (53.4 per cent) than Hindus (35.9 per cent), Christians (21.4 per cent) or Others (44.6 per cent). This goes along with the fact that there are less Muslims in regular wage or salaried employment (just 28.9 per cent) than Hindus (46.7 per cent), Christians (56.1 per cent) or Others (38.3 per cent) (NSSO 438th and 468th Reports).

The 1990s have seen the increasing disparity of Muslims vis-à-vis Hindus in education, landholdings, employment and consumption expenditure (Hasan and Menon 2004). Muslims in the Indian Administrative and Indian Police Services have always been less than 5 per cent. In Central Government Organizations across fourteen states, Muslim employees constituted just 4 per cent of the total. Dalits, probably due to reservation policies, were better represented at 14 per cent of the total. In the Lok Sabha, Muslims have never been more than 9 per cent at any time.

While Muslims are poorly represented in the Indian Police Service, in state police services the situation is marginally better. Scholars have argued that there is a relationship between representation of different groups in the police force and the impartiality of the police in civic conflict. The police much closer to society tends to reflect social biases and prejudices. This question is very relevant here because it brings into focus the issue of the security of an entire class of citizens. Many 'riots' in Independent India, have actually been clashes of Muslims with the police (Moradabad 1980; Meerut 1987). The active hostility of the police towards Muslims has been pointed out on many occasions (Mumbai 1993; Gujarat 2002). Not surprisingly, minorities including the Muslims display a greater faith in the role of the army in incidents of civic conflict.

Muslims and the Police

Khalidi (2003) argues that there are three categories of states: those with low minority representation but impartial, those with high minority percentage but biased and those with low minority representation and biased and hostile. Sometimes, due to political reasons, a normally biased state may act impartially. States with low representation of minorities but which have usually acted in an unbiased way include Kerala and West Bengal, Bihar under Laloo Prasad Yadav and Uttar Pradesh under Mulayam Singh. In Kerala and West Bengal, the percentage of Muslims in the police force is far lower than their numbers in the population in general. Yet, the police have generally acted impartially in conflict situations. In West Bengal, the CPI-M's policy of secularism and in Kerala the reign of the Communists in alliance with the Muslim League in coalition governments have ensured a policy of neutrality.

Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are states normally acting in biased ways; but sometimes, they have acted out of political compulsions, in a secular way. In 1990, under Mulayam Singh, Uttar Pradesh police prevented the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. In 1992, Laloo Prasad ensured that the police in Bihar were able to prevent the outbreak of riots and communal violence after the demolition of the mosque.

The second category includes Andhra Pradesh and Delhi. Muslims are over-represented in the Andhra police, but the force usually acts with bias. In Delhi, there were 21 per cent Sikhs in the police and only 6.2 per cent in the population in general. Even so, the events of 1984 were not prevented.

Given this background, is it then to be argued that there is no valid relationship between minority representation in the force and impartiality? This author would like to continue to assert that there is a relationship. The deciding factors in any situation are: a) the ideological orientation of the regime in power and b) the balance of power held by the Muslims or other minorities. In Andhra, the Muslims are highly represented in the police but they are largely in subordinate rather than command positions. Most other states fall in the third category. However, a distinction may be made between active hostility (Moradabad 1980; Meerut 1987; Mumbai 1993; Gujarat 2002) from weakness and dereliction of duty (Ayodhya 1992).

Other indicators of marginalization

The educational backwardness of Muslims in India has been well documented and several reasons have been put forward for it. These reasons include the difficulties of language, the poor resources in Muslim-dominated areas, the poverty of Muslims, the Partition which took most middle-class Muslims to Pakistan and others. All in all, what one finds is that Muslims have poorer educational achievement in relation to other communities even if they are in a majority in a particular district and even if one looks at educational institutions that are founded and run by the Muslims themselves.

Muslim development indices with regard to fertility, income levels and educational achievement levels are found to be better in states and regions (as for instance in Kerala or Karnataka) with a history of less communal conflict. There is reason to believe that recurrent communal conflict and violence has a depressing effect on Muslim achievement and aspiration in general.

Secularism, democracy and the rule of law

Clearly, what we have said so far indicates the need for the active enhancement of the social, political and economic profile of Muslims. The life and property and livelihood of an entire community have been seen to be at considerable risk. The community feels continually threatened by police bias and political hostility. 'Encounters', police raids, 'combing operations' and selective curfew leave the community troubled and uneasy. In many Indian cities and increasingly in other areas as well, one sees the growing ghettoization of Muslims. A degree of discrimination appears to operate in ensuring that such areas remain generally poorly serviced by civic bodies. Muslims even in big cities often find that their names and their religion become liabilities in their search for housing in good localities.

Current political discourses allow the entry of the notion that secularism is a 'favour' to minorities and that secularism exists in India largely because of the presence of so many minority groups. Yet, it must be critically underlined that democracy, the rule of law and secularism are intrinsically and not merely adventitiously interlinked. Even if all Indians were of one religion, only secularism could protect the democratic framework. This is because, crucially, secularism works not merely to protect 'communities' from each other as it were, but also to protect individuals from the tight confinement that communities sometimes seek to impose on them.

Today, the madrasa and the mosque are under increasing scrutiny. There is clearly the threat of the spread of different radical ideologies. Nevertheless, experience has shown that militancy and terror are best prevented and contained when communities have faith in the state, the law and the police and are willing to work with them.

Security is thus best ensured by ensuring security, the protection of life, property and livelihood, the maintenance of law and proper governance. Communities and civil society organizations should be taken into confidence in the work of containing terrorism. Engaging with civil society can prevent civic conflict and can help contain militancy and terrorism. The state must work to flush out terrorists without alienating or incriminating whole communities. The police and army cannot protect against terror, only the active and continuous watchfulness of communities and the public can. Security cannot be assured by the display or employment of sophisticated weaponry. Security rather lies in the myriad acts of vigilance of ordinary citizens. This vigilance and constant awareness can only be built on the mutual trust of state and communities.

Agents of the state need therefore to interact continuously with local level committees (such as Mumbai's mohalla committees) and with other civic groups in society. The possibilities of working with madrasas to improve education, an experiment already successfully tried in some states, should be explored. Of even greater significance perhaps is the need for quick and impartial action in times of civic and ethnic violence. The protection of all citizens must be ensured by the state; it is the state's primary duty. Justice needs to be done; even more than that, it needs to be seen to be done. For, we should remember that a society that does not secure all, will secure none.