Ms. Teresita C. Schaffer
Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka &
Head, South Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, D.C.

Ms. Teresita C. Schaffer and Mr. M.K. Narayanan

A roundtable on "Fresh Impressions from Sri Lanka" was organised by CSA on 24 April 04. Ms. Teresita C. Schaffer, former Ambassador to Sri Lanka, and Head, South Asia Program of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. was the guest speaker. Ms. Schaffer, on her way from Colombo to Washington, shared her impressions about the present situation in Sri Lanka. Mr. M.K. Narayanan, Vice President of CSA introduced the speaker and moderated the discussion. Members of CSA, experts in the field, Sri Lanka watchers and journalists who had extensively covered Sri Lanka were also part of the roundtable.

Ms. Schaffer described the events in the three weeks before the roundtable as three interlocking dramas, viz., the political, the personal/constitutional, and the national dramas.

Political Drama

Ms. Schaffer termed the astounding gains that the JVP made in the recent elections at the expense of the two major political parties as the political drama. She said that the Sri Lankan Parliament was remarkably divided and polarised. Though one might agree that it was a sign of strength for Sri Lanka's democracy that all major shades were represented in the Parliament, the showing of the JVP was a real shocker. Nearly half of the 106 members (45 percent) flying the banner of Chandrika Kumaratunga had come from the JVP. The fact that the votes were specifically cast to the JVP in preference to SLFP and other political parties represented a number of things.

One was a stunning rebuke to the two major political parties in Sri Lanka. Both parties were seen as corrupt, backward and unable to deliver the goods particularly to the lower middle class and the lower audience. Hence, part of the JVP phenomenon was the people's feeling that they could give the JVP a chance. To Ms. Schaffer, who had been to Sri Lanka only a couple of years after the last JVP episode, it was absolutely stunning to see that only twelve years later the people were giving a chance to the party that had caused so much death and destruction. It was indicative of the level of frustration among the lower and lower middle class with the mainstream political parties.

Personal/Constitutional Drama

The second drama that Ms. Schaffer mentioned was the personal/constitutional drama. President Chandrika Kumaratunga, uncomfortable with power sharing and cohabitation, held an election on the assumption she would win. Having held one, to extend her political authority beyond 2005 or 2006 when her second term as President would end, she wanted to bring about a constitutional amendment, especially with regard to political power. However, it was felt that it would be a much more complicated task. She found that she had no support outside her own party on the issue of constitutional amendment. In addition, the fact that her candidate lost Speakership suggested that converting the Parliament into a Constituent Assembly would not work. Ms. Schaffer said that she might choose another route and considered the likelihood of referendum as highly probable. However, she added that that route would be fraught with trouble. It could be seen that the political institutions or the Parliament were coming under enormous strain and to compound the problem it would coincide with the tremendous strain within the ruling coalition over the frustrated policy issues in the country. A case in point was the standoff over the distribution of portfolios in the Ministry. The President did not want to honour her earlier pledge to the JVP, as that would erode her vote base.

National Drama

The third drama she mentioned was the future of the ethnic conflict, which she termed as the national drama. The President soon after the elections said that she wanted to continue the peace process and formally approached the Norwegians. The stage was set for resuming the talks. However, Ms. Schaffer raised the question that given the JVP's strong opposition to devolution what kind of backing would President Chandrika Kumaratunga have at the talks. What would they talk about?

Mr. K.V. Krishnaswamy, Ms. Teresita C. Schaffer and Dr. V. Suryanarayan at the roundtable.

According to Ms. Schaffer, the assumption of the people who ran the Peace Secretariat - they were professional and technocrats - was that it would be necessary and possible to pick up negotiations on the issue of Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). The LTTE had made proposals that would be difficult for the government to accept. Ms. Schaffer said that it would be an excruciatingly difficult task for the government. She wondered whether it would be possible for the government to keep in play the self governing issue in a formal sense and try and reach some interim practical agreements in the area of reconstruction. According to her, a fair amount of activity was likely. There would be a fair amount of paper passing and the Norwegians would be involved in a number of meetings, though she said that she would be surprised if there were any early meetings between the LTTE and the government. She thought that it suited everybody to maintain the ceasefire or maintain the appearance of ceasefire. Most of those whom she met felt that that stage would last for sometime, at least a year. However, she said that she was not sure whether she shared that perception. She was of the opinion that the LTTE would try and create a situation in which the government would have to make the first move. The LTTE would probably be looking for ways to demonstrate to Sri Lanka and to the world that they were perfectly capable of doing things their own way, while keeping the self-governing issue on the table.

She concluded by giving her impressions about Jaffna. She said that despite the return of normalcy with fewer check posts and bunkers it was still a very uncertain city. When one talked to people one would not see so much in what they said but what they did not say. Anyone who had any kind of official position, were still juggling in a dangerous net of relationships with the government, the LTTE and others. They were acutely conscious of the fact that the spider web of relationships on which they act could come apart anytime.

India's Role

On the question of India's role, Ms. Schaffer said that since the government made the announcement on the need for India to involve, most of the people she met were wondering if India wanted to get anymore involved. Many felt that it was quite unrealistic. Moreover, India perhaps would not want to become a more visible and public player.

Ms. Nirupama Subramaniam said that with the JVP growing from strength to strength there could be another election sooner than later. In such a situation, one would have to look at the JVP as a long-term player and India should do something. From what she could judge from the Sri Lankan press, she said that India had played some role in bringing the JVP and the SLFP together. She said so though there was no proof that India had played some role. Many people were hoping that in future India would keep the JVP leashed or try and persuade it to abandon its extreme stand on devolution. People had said that if one could talk to the LTTE, why not the JVP, which was already in the democratic process. There was a better chance of changing the JVP's views than that of the LTTE. She further added that the Sri Lankan government was prone to depend more and more on India because of the emerging situation. As India did not want Ealam and as we were in the brink of Ealam by default, one would see both the JVP and Chandrika Kumaratunga engaging India. With India's influence with the JVP, and Kadirgamar, Chandrika and JVP falling back on India, India could help in formulating a response to put something on the table.

Dr. V. Suryanarayan said that the JVP had given up the stridency and the credit must be given to the Indian diplomats for softening their stand. The first indication was when they supported the legislation providing citizenship to plantation Tamils, which ten years earlier would have been impossible. He also said that as and when JVP comes to power in various local bodies they would realise that the constitutional devolution of powers would be in their interest also.

Mr. K. Venkatramanan stated that the government was in a much weaker position than the LTTE because of two reasons. One, the government was palpably in a minority and the other, the eastern rebellion was completely quelled. He further said that India did have the idea that it could chart the course of the next round of negotiations, as it had expressed reservations at the manner in which peace process was pursued by the last government. And even if India had any idea that it could guide the course of the peace process in a more meaningful way - in a way that may not aid the politico-military consolidation of the LTTE - he thought that the chances were next to nil. It was primarily because of those two reasons.

Mr. M. K. Narayanan found it difficult to believe as to why would India like to get involved with a fragile government. The biggest problem for that government was its own combination. The UPFP was only a marriage of convenience. Their agenda, concepts, and ideas were quite different from each other. In such a situation, on India's stand and what India would like to do, he said that there were more things that India would not like to do. We would not want the Sea Tigers and would not want them patrolling. With the general feeling that there would be an election within a couple of years, the question was what would be the intervening period like. Would we have an intensified friction within the ruling combination and between them and the others? There were a whole lot of questions to be answered, before we could see what an outside power be it the US, Norway, or India for that matter could do.

Rear Admiral Mohan Raman said that the Sri Lankans were hoping that others would solve their problem and expect that somebody else would pull their chestnuts out of the fire. Outside powers like India, the US and Japan would have to convey to the Sri Lankans that it was their responsibility to solve the problem. At least then, they would take some realistic steps. They had not taken any concrete step towards having a federal structure. He also added that as far as India was concerned there were only two major interests, viz., the fishermen problem and the Sea Tigers. As far as the refugees were concerned, they would be happy to go back once the situation was resolved.

US Role

According to Ms. Schaffer, though the US was not a major player in the peace process, it was still very supportive. It had increased its aid and had given a lot of encouragement to the process. Her view was that the level of US contribution to Sri Lanka would depend on the progress of a meaningful process. Without that, the US attention would flag quickly. She also added that the US was certainly not looking for any major role and they were happy to help Sri Lanka get whatever assistance possible.

On the question of applying pressure on the LTTE, especially with regard to funds emanating from the US and Canada, Ms. Schaffer said that the LTTE was put on the US terrorism list and there were restrictions on doing business with the LTTE. Canada with its large Tamil immigrants had a different kind of dynamics. She said that they looked at the Tamil immigrants as refugees, with a number of organisations monitoring and working for them. Their way of working was different and the US could not talk about it. How much pressure the US could put on LTTE depended, Ms. Schaffer said, entirely on whether it was important for the LTTE to be considered a "respectable organisation" or not. The LTTE had made it clear that they were very sensitive about being on the terrorism list, but they have not accepted the type of reasons conveyed to them from US government sources. Now they may ask for removal from the terrorism list. However, she said that it was a fact that the LTTE continue to kill their Tamil political rivals, which from the US point of view was an act of terrorism. However, the LTTE does not feel that way.

LTTE Stronger

A Section of the Participants at the roundtable.

Commenting on the current situation in Sri Lanka, Mr. K. Venkatramanan said that a lot of things happened in the two weeks from April 9 to April 22. Talking to both the Indian diplomats and Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar, the foreign minister to be on that day, he found that there was an air of optimism in the first few days. The situation was simple. The government expected to garner a majority in the Parliament and they thought that the LTTE was on a slightly weak wicket because the Eastern rebellion was then active. However, two things took place. One, the government was palpably in the minority and the other, the eastern rebellion had been completely quelled. As a result, Prabhakaran became both militarily and politically stronger than ever. The government was in no position to offer anything in the talks. The effect could already be seen. To some extent, it had already succumbed to the Vanni leadership of the mainstream LTTE. It allowed soldiers or cadres of the LTTE to cross both by land and by sea to the East. Perhaps, that was probably done on an implicit promise that the LTTE would talk to the present government. That was probably the weakest link in Chandrika's dispensation. That she had an assurance that they would talk to her was the only gain.

Mr. M.K. Narayanan wondered whether, in some sense, we were closer to Ealam than ever before, as the UPFP could not hold and others were really holding. He further said that, the events between April 9 and April 22 had clearly shown that the weakest party was the UPFP, whereas the LTTE had conclusively proved that it was the sole authentic voice of the Tamils, whether by might, strength or force of arms. In effect, one was really at the brink. The LTTE would be making incremental attempts at implementing the ISGA and the government would be in no position to stand up against it. He said that one party which was unwilling to go to the conflict was the Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan army.

Ms. Schaffer, said that the Sri Lankan did not want the conflict renewed. She said that Chandrika Kumaratunga's first priority was securing her future. The second priority was securing her party base. And the third priority was preventing the LTTE issue from blowing up. Ms. Schaffer further said that Chandrika Kumaratunga when she started the peace process in 1994 showed tremendous political courage in doing so.

She further added that she did not see much on the horizon. She said that she had been trying to think what could take place. Conceivably, it may be possible to achieve small agreements on different aspects of reconstruction. But, she said that she did not see much on the horizon that would bring the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE closer to an overall understanding on how they could work together for Sri Lanka's future.

Responding to Ms. Schaffer's question whether it would be possible to redefine Eelam, Mr. M.K. Narayanan said that Prabhakaran was dogmatic and has only Eelam in his mind. Dr. Swarna Rajagopalan said that Prabhakaran was the most strategic player in the situation. Removed from the pressure of facing elections, he was sitting back and waiting for Colombo to fall apart. Dr. V. Suryanarayan said that Prabhakaran had been educating himself in the political process. Initially, Anton Balasingham was the political spokesman for long. But he has been sidelined and the present political advisor Tamilchelvan works directly under Prabhakaran. He said that, as a result Prabhakaran possessed two hats - political hat and military hat. Earlier he was just a jungle guerrilla. Karuna was just a case of becoming too big for his boots. He agreed that Prabhakaran would put the governing features one by one and lead to a Cyprus like situation.

Compiled by R. Venkataramanujam